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Labor Standards, Economic Development, 
and International Trade 
Gary S. Fields 
Higher real earnings at the fullest possible level of employment are the 
goals of those of us who work in the labor field. This paper addresses the 
role of labor standards in helping to achieve those goals.1 
The United States government has two sets of interests in labor 
standards. The Department of Labor is supposed to "foster, promote, and 
develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States, to improve 
their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable 
employment." The Agency for International Development seeks to "help the 
poor toward a better life" in a variety of ways, among which are increasing 
employment and earnings and achieving a more equitable distribution of 
income.2 Although this conference is sponsored by the Department of 
Labor, the interests assigned to AID should not be forgotten. 
Conceptualizing Labor Standards and Government's Role 
in Promoting Them 
Labor Standards: Labor Relations Process or Labor Market Outcome? 
What do we mean by labor standards? The conference convener has 
proposed the following working definition: "appropriate country-specific 
implementation of a) the right of association, b) the right to organize and 
bargain collectively, c) a prohibition on forced and compulsory labor, d) a 
minimum age for workers, and e) acceptable working conditions (possibly 
including maximum hours of work per week, a weekly rest period, limits to 
work by young persons, a minimum wage, minimum workplace safety and 
health standards, and elimination of employment discrimination)."3 
'I am grateful to Henry Wan and John Windmuller for helpful discussions and 
comments during the preparation of this paper. 
*The quote is from the 1975 amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
3For other views, see Edgren 1979; Addison and Demery 1985; AFL-CIO 1988; 
International Metalworkers Federation 1988; and Marshall 1988. 
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The vast majority of the workers of the world are unable to enjoy labor 
standards like those listed in the preceding paragraph, especially those under 
item e). The reason is simple: the economies in which they live are too poor. 
For example, if the choice is between subsistence needs and "decent" work 
hours, the work days will be very long. Or if the choice is between child 
labor on the family farm or a smaller harvest, children will work long and 
hard in the fields. Thus, in talking about labor standards in the context of 
workers in poor countries, a workable and pertinent definition must be 
offered. 
Here is my suggestion. Certain actions are abusive anywhere, among 
them: slavery, prohibitions on freedom of association or on collective 
bargaining, exposure of workers to unsafe or unhealthy working conditions 
without their having the fullest possible information about these conditions, 
and the employment of children for long work hours simply because they 
are cheaper to hire than adults. These are outrages against the human 
condition. No person should have to endure such conditions, and no country 
should knowingly permit such abuses. 
What I have presented is a minimalist list of violations of standards in 
the labor relations process. Once these conditions have been satisfied, labor 
standards might best be gauged in terms of labor market outcomes. I 
would say, very simply, that if more workers are employed in better jobs, 
labor standards improve. The outcome-oriented approach which I favor thus 
gauges labor standards in terms of fullness of employment and real wage (or 
earnings) levels. 
Some analysts have put forth conceptualizations of labor standards 
which confound labor relations process and labor market outcome. For 
instance, Marshall (1988, p. 2) has argued that "labor standards, especially 
the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively, make it possible 
for third world incomes to be higher and more equitably distributed." He \s 
assuming that workers' incomes will be improved if and only if free 
association and collective bargaining are guaranteed. This equation of labor 
relations process and labor market outcome denies two logically possible 
alternatives: that incomes might rise and be distributed more equally even 
in the absence of collective organization and bargaining, or that the exercise 
of collective bargaining might result unwittingly in lower employment in 
covered sectors, higher unemployment in the economy, or lower wages for 
workers crowded into uncovered sectors. Hence, not only are labor relations 
process and labor market outcome logically distinct: they may even conflict. 
To illustrate how the process-oriented and outcome-oriented approaches 
might differ, take the case of a poor underdeveloped economy'in which 
unemployment and underemployment are widespread and wages and self-
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employment earnings are very low. The workers in such countries are forced 
by economic necessity to take whatever employment they can find. In a very 
fundamental sense, the entire situation is abusive-the best choice from 
among a set of bad alternatives is very bad indeed. For the workers of that 
country, the situation is rendered less abusive if better jobs are offered to 
more of them. In the opinions of the very considerable majority of workers 
with whom I have discussed this issue, I have found that whether or not they 
have a union is not, for them, a burning issue, nor is coverage under a fair 
labor standards act. For them, the goal is better jobs. 
Let me here record my preference for an approach to labor standards 
based principally on labor market outcomes. The all-important objective of 
U.S. policy toward developing countries is (or should be) the alleviation of 
extreme poverty. If pushed too far, too fast, the active promotion of labor 
standards may hamper employment, reduce competitiveness, and impede 
growth. The poor workers of the world cannot afford this. 
Direct versus Indirect Promotion of Labor Standards 
In some countries, it has been government policy to promote labor 
standards directly. From the point of view of process, direct interventions 
include the passage of laws governing such workplace issues as freedom of 
association, the right to collective bargaining, freedom from indentured 
servitude, maximum hours, minimum age, and so on. Another type of direct 
government intervention involves actions aimed at improving employment 
and earning opportunities. Direct employment creation has been the aim of 
many developing country governments, the government itself often serving 
as an employer of last resort. In some cases, governments have called upon 
the private sector to increase its employment as well, as in Kenya's famed 
(and flawed) Tripartite Agreements (Harbison 1967; Stewart 1979). As for 
attempts by governments to increase earnings, a commonly-used mechanism 
is minimum wage legislation (Starr 1981). Other common mechanisms 
include the active encouragement of trade unions and workers' federations, 
the encouragement of multinational firms to pay "decent" wages to local 
residents, and government's own pay policy with respect to public sector 
employees.4 
A small number of developing country governments have even 
undertaken ambitious programs aimed at fully regulating workplace 
*These policies are described at greater length in many sources; e.g., Squire 1981, 
Fields 1984 and the references cited therein. 
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conditions, thereby trying to increase both employment and labor earnings. 
One such attempt is the enactment by the government of Panama of a labor 
code controlling hiring, layoffs, earnings, and fringe benefits. Evaluations of 
this program have generally concluded that labor costs were very 
substantially increased and employment very substantially decreased 
(Spinanger 1985 and Butelmann and Videla 1985; for a contrary view, see 
PREALC 1980). In response to continuing economic difficulties, the 
government of Panama has recently relaxed many of the previous provisions 
of the labor code. 
In contrast to the direct measures described thus far in this section, 
some governments, especially in the Far East, have adopted more indirect 
measures to improve labor standards. The experience of the Far East is often 
misunderstood. Some observers are well-aware of the fact that those 
economies achieved their economic growth by exporting to world markets, 
and therefore assume that free market policies were responsible. Others have 
the opposite view: that the Far East is dominated by mercantilist 
governments, as exemplified by Japan's famous MITI. Both views are 
mistaken. In fact, there is considerable diversity within the Far East. We find 
much more government involvement in the economies of Korea and 
Singapore than in those of Taiwan and Hong Kong (Krause 1985; Scitovsky 
1986). 
Notwithstanding the different approaches to government involvement in 
the Far East, the general philosophy in that part of the world is that workers 
are best helped by rapid economic growth of a labor-intensive character. 
Indeed, the evidence presented below shows that they have been-which is 
why indirect promotion of labor standards may be a preferred alternative to 
direct labor standards legislation. 
Wage Policy 
A third issue in conceptualizing labor standards concerns wage policy. 
In previous work (e.g.. Fields 1984, 1985), I characterized wage policies 
dichotomously: (1) Lenient, meaning that the government actively 
encourages or at least tolerates minimum wages, unions, and other 
institutions which push wages up above market levels; or (2) Strict, meaning 
that the government discourages or actively opposes such institutions. This 
dichotomy was intended to highlight a key distinction: whether wage-setting 
is by market or non-market forces. 
I would now suggest a somewhat expanded taxonomy: (1) High wage 
policy, meaning that the government encourages or creates institutions 
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pushing wages up above market levels; (2) Market wage policy, in which the 
government allows wages to be determined by supply and demand; and (3) 
Repressive wage policy, where the government deliberately attempts to hold 
wages down below market levels. Wage repression was discussed but not 
emphasized in Fields 1985 and Fields and Wan 1989. It has occurred in 
Singapore (by government influence on the National Wages Council) and in 
Korea (by government pressure on management and through the banks).5 
From time to time, both countries' governments sought to hold wages down 
in order to sustain export expansion. 
As with the question of direct versus indirect promotion of labor 
standards, well-meaning governments may pursue different wage policies in 
their attempts to improve workers' standards of living. As long as labor 
demand curves are downward-sloping, though, pushing wages up above 
market levels will result in reduced employment, and probably reduced 
national output too. Equally important, as long as labor supply curves are 
upward-sloping, wage repression will cause labor shortages and will thus 
also have these same adverse effects on employment and national output. 
Market wage determination may result in the best labor market outcomes of 
all. Good intentions do not necessarily make good laws. 
Labor Standards and Economic Growth 
Which policies have had favorable consequences? Do the workers of 
developing countries themselves benefit from higher standards of living 
when economic growth is rapid? For this, the evidence from the newly-
industrializing economies (NIEs) of Asia is particularly instructive. 
It is well known that the NIEs of East Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Korea, and Taiwan) have done extremely well in macroeconomic terms. 
Their GNP growth rates have exceeded eight percent for a quarter-century. 
Growth rates of this magnitude are unsurpassed in the developing world. 
What have been the effects of this rapid growth on labor markets? The data 
needed to answer this question appear in table 1-1. We see: 
• These economies attained essentially full employment in the 1960s. 
• Thereafter, the mix of jobs improved. 
5On Singapore, see Lim and Pang 1982 and Lee 1986. On Korea, see Nam 1984, 
Bai 1985 and Scitovsky 1986. 
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Table 1-1. The Labor Market in Four Asian Newly-Industrializing Economies 
s 
I. Unemployment rate 
fl. 
A. 
B. 
C, 
D. 
lit. 
IV. 
V. 
Employment composition 
Agriculture as a % of total 
employment 
Employees as % of economically 
active population (EAP) 
Professional & tech,, admin. * 
managerial, clerical, & sales 
occupations as % of EAP 
% of employed workers with no 
schooling [% illiterate] 
Real wages or earnings 
Poverty: % of households with 
income below 
inequality, as measured by Qini co-
efficient among households for 
individuals! 
Hong Kong 
1961:1.7% 
1980:3.7% 
1961:7,4% 
1980:1.4% 
1961:83.8% 
1980:89.4% 
1961:27.5% 
1980:32,5% 
1961:20.2% 
1980:10.4% 
Index of avg. real 
manuf. wage, 
1949*100: 
1960:105 
1980:253 
HK$30O0 annually in 
constant 1966 HK$ 
1966:18% 
1976:7% 
1966:0.487 
1981:0,447 
Korea 
1963:8.2% 
1981:4.1% 
1963:63.2% 
1980:34.0% 
1963:31.5% 
1980:47.3% 
1963:16,9% 
f 1980:29.5% 
1960:44.7% 
1960:16.0% 
Index of real 
earnings, 
1975 * 100 
1966:52 
1980:159' 
A constant real 
poverty line 
1965:41% 
1976:15% 
1964:0.34 
1976:0.38 
Singapore 
1957:5.2% 
1980:3.5% 
1957:6.9% 
1979:1,5% 
1957:73.7% 
1979:83.5% 
1957:36,8% 
1979:42.6% • 
1966:54.1% 
1980:22.5% 
Index of real 
wkly, earnings, 
a[| industries: 
1975;1DQ 
1980:120 
S$200 per mo. 
in 1975 Prices 
1966:37% 
1980:18% 
1966:10.499] 
1980;[0 455] 
Taiwan 
1955:6.3% 
1981:1.3% 
1966:50,0% 
1979:21.5% 
1956:36.8% 
1979:63.7% 
1964:224% 
1979:30,0% 
1965:[26.0%] 
1980:[9.0%] 
Index of real 
manuf. earnings 
1954 * 100 
1960:102 
1979:400 
NT$20,000 in 
specified year 
1964:35% 
1972:10% 
Early I950's:0.6 
1976-78:0,27... 
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Q Real wages rose by as much as a factor of four. 
• Absolute poverty fell. 
• Income inequality remained at low to moderate levels. 
This evidence admits of only one interpretation: the workers in these 
economies benefitted from aggregate economic growth in proportion to 
their original incomes. They were not impoverished by growth. Had they 
been, it would have been an abusive outcome. In fact, however, rapid 
economic growth generated an equally rapid increase in the demand for 
labor. In the initial stages of these economies' growth, rapid increases in 
employment were generated with only modest increases in wages. Once 
essentially-full employment was attained, and the so-called Fei-Ranis turning 
point was reached, the increased demand for labor had a different outcome: 
the bidding-up of wages as firms competed for a scarce labor supply. 
From the point of view of organized labor and formal processes, these 
economies have exhibited much less progress.6 Labor institutions in 
Singapore have been limited by the de-registration of a communist labor 
union, large-scale arrests of union leaders followed by long jail terms, the 
restriction of fringe benefits through collective bargaining, the outlawing of 
strikes, the channeling of labor-management relations through the govern-
ment-backed National Trade Union Congress, and the suppression of wage 
increases through government influence on the National Wages Council. In 
Taiwan, the Union Act requires that factories be unionized so that workers' 
organizations can be controlled by government, strikes are oudawed, and the 
labor movement is underfinanced. In Korea, labor unions have little power: 
workers may form unions but firms are not obligated to bargain with them, 
national unions or the nationwide Federation of Korean Trade Unions may 
not intervene in collective bargaining on behalf of a local union, a cooling-
off period is required in the event of a labor dispute, arbitration is 
compulsory, and the government may intervene in any strike that threatens 
to develop into a major job action. By contrast, the industrial relations 
situation in Hong Kong is one of laissez faire. The trade union movement 
is neither favored nor discouraged by existing legislation (though to some 
observers, the lack of encouragement may itself be seen as a violation of 
labor standards). 
6See Fields and Wan 1989 and the references cited therein for more details. 
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In sum, the experiences of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
exhibit a common feature: although the institutional structure of industrial 
relations continues to restrict labor organizations and collective bargaining, 
labor market opportunities have been getting very much better. To those who 
judge labor standards by process, the lack of collective bargaining and 
protective labor legislation would appear as an abuse of labor standards 
which is getting no better in the course of economic growth. But to others 
who are more outcome oriented, the attainment of full employment and the 
creation of new jobs at substantially higher rates of pay than those workers 
had been able to earn before is a sign that labor standards are improving. 
Abuse of labor standards is in the eye of the beholder. 
Successful Trade Policies 
The successes of the newly-industrializing economies are based on a 
whole host of favorable policies. Harberger (1985) has done an excellent job 
of summarizing the policy packages which have led to successes or failures 
in various countries of the developing world. 
At the risk of oversimplifying, I would say that the successes had one 
feature in common: the unremitting drive to seek to produce and sell 
profitably the products that those who had the purchasing power were able 
and willing to buy. The successful countries believed that world markets 
would be substantially open to the great majority of the goods they could 
produce, provided that those goods were at least as good in terms of quality 
and price as the goods made elsewhere. This belief was correct for most 
products. It was not correct for a few, such as textiles and sugar. 
In essence, those countries produced according to comparative 
advantage. They had abundant labor which was well-educated. Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan had enough land to make agricultural production viable, at least 
for a while. Hong Kong and Singapore did not even have that. None of 
those economies had significant minerals. Some, such as Ranis (1974), 
would go so far as to say that it was actually to their advantage not to have 
had significant non-labor resources: the absence of these resources, in his 
view, forced those countries to seek products and methods of production 
which used what they had, rather than considering the potentially dangerous 
and less beneficial course of exporting minerals or mineral products, which 
makes very little use of labor and hence has very little effect on workers' 
standards of living. 
Another point about comparative advantage bears mention. Comparative 
advantage shifts. One reason is that labor market conditions change 
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endogenously. The Asian economies' very successes in achieving labor-
intensive growth led to increased labor scarcity and rising real wages. These 
in turn led to a change in comparative advantage. Another reason is 
learning-by-doing. If a country could immediately develop its electronics 
industry, it might never develop its textiles industry. The textiles industry is 
developed, however, because learning-by-doing in textiles may facilitate the 
subsequent development of the electronics industry. Changing comparative 
advantage implies the need for countries to change their trade and 
development strategies. The Far Eastern economies recognized this and 
avoided clinging to industries beyond the point of economic viability. 
Restructuring took different forms in different industries. Some 
industries in Asia found it profitable to pay the higher wages rather than do 
without labor, examples are electronics and heavy manufacturing. Other 
industries found that they could automate, and so accommodated to the new 
situation in that way. Yet other industries found that it did not pay either to 
pay higher wages or to automate; those industries closed down and moved 
offshore. Textiles is a prime example of an industry which has moved quite 
rapidly; such aspiring newly-industrializing economies as Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka are taking over. 
The economies of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan embarked 
on programs in the late 1970s and early 1980s aimed at capital-deepening 
in order to economize on very scarce labor. Economic planners and 
entrepreneurs in the Far East fully believe that they will have to continue 
restructuring in the future as much as they have in the past. They seek to 
anticipate shifting comparative advantage and to allocate resources to take 
advantage of new opportunities. The drive for export expansion goes on 
unabated. 
Interactions Among Trade Policies and Labor Market 
Policies 
Above, I have expressed the view that world markets are generally open 
to good products from wherever they are made. From this, there follows a 
corollary: a country that cannot produce goods of higher quality and/or lower 
cost compared with existing suppliers will not be able to export successfully. 
One important determinant of the ability to compete is the country's labor 
market policies. 
I have suggested that wage policies be classified into three 
categories-high wage policy, market wage policy, or repressive wage policy. 
Suppose that a country's lenient labor market policy causes its wages to be 
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above market level. Some part of this wage increase may be offset by 
improved efficiency, shock effects, higher morale, or other corresponding 
improvements. Suppose, however, that when wages rise by x percent, 
efficiency rises but by less than x percent. Simple neoclassical analysis 
predicts that because firms' marginal cost curves are higher than they would 
otherwise be, they will produce less than they would have had wages been 
lower. Decreased production results in less employment. Thus, higher wages 
for some come at the expense of lower employment for others. 
A lenient labor market policy might even render exporting socially 
unprofitable. When a country exports, it must incur costs, some of which 
would not be incurred otherwise. Examples are harbors, airports, industrial 
parks in free trade zones, and overseas export promotion offices. Developing 
countries often promote exports by subsidizing such "quasi-fixed costs" in 
an environment of high labor costs. If they do, but high labor costs lead to 
low exports, the earnings from exporting might not be sufficient to justify 
the quasi-fixed cost. In other words, even though goods are in fact exported 
and the export firm earns a profit, once due account is taken of the costs of 
export promotion, the country as a whole might lose from exporting. 
The literature suggests that something like this may be responsible for 
some countries' lack of successes with export-led growth. In Jamaica, strong 
trade unions have caused wages in the manufacturing sector to be at least 
twice the going wage elsewhere in the economy (Harrod 1972). Jamaica's 
lack of success with manufactured exports has been attributed in part to high 
labor costs (Tidrick 1975; Chernick 1978). In Colombia, high wage costs are 
among the reasons why the emperor's new clothes are not made there.7 In 
those cases, as in many others, wage increases may be said to have been 
premature, in the sense that higher wages were offered to some before such 
wage levels were warranted by those workers' productivity and by 
conditions in those countries labor markets. 
When the goods produced by high wage labor are for domestic 
consumption, and when lower-cost foreign goods are kept out by tariffs, 
quotas, or other import barriers, the goods can be sold, albeit at higher 
prices and lower quantity than would have been the case had the industry 
not been protected. Protection thus compels domestic consumers to buy from 
domestic producers or do without the good. However, when those goods are 
offered for foreign consumption, no policy instrument is available to compel 
foreign consumers to buy those goods rather than seeking suppliers 
elsewhere. Losses from exports become a distinct possibility. 
7See Morawetz 1982, who also deserves credit for this ingenious way of putting it. 
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In this way, a country's trade strategy interacts with its choice of wage 
policy: to decide to seek export-led growth may preclude premature wage 
increases,-whereas to decide to push wages up above market-clearing levels 
may imply that export-led growth must be eschewed in favor of an inward-
looking strategy, with all the possible losses attendant to such a strategy 
(higher prices to consumers, lower availability of goods, economic 
inefficiencies). 
Implications for the United States and Other Advanced 
Economies 
As shown above, in the Far East, rapid economic growth resulted in the 
attainment of full employment and the subsequent increase in real wages for 
the entire labor force. However, tight labor markets in turn necessitated 
restructuring. 
A very important lesson from the Far East is that those econonues 
recognized the shift in comparative advantage and sought to adjust to it. The 
advanced countries of the world need to understand that their comparative 
advantages are no more fixed than are those in the newly-industrializing 
economies and that economic growth necessarily entails a response, the 
forces of resistance notwithstanding (e.g., Windmuller 1978; Aho and 
Aronson 1985). One response that has been suggested is protection. 
The call has gone out for the U.S. to react to international competition 
by protecting U.S. industries and U.S. workers against goods produced by 
low-wage labor in other countries. I am wary of such calls, not on any 
ideological grounds (I am hardly a free marketeer) but because I think it 
would do the U.S. more harm than good. 
Protection is problematical. U.S. workers are also consumers, and they 
will pay higher prices if U.S. markets are protected. Because of protection, 
Japanese consumers pay five times the world price for the rice they eaL This 
is not in their interest Similar protection against imports would not be in the 
interest of U.S. workers as consumers. Furthermore, increased protection by 
the United States might stimulate those countries with the power to retaliate 
to in fact do so. This invites inefficiencies and uncertainties at best and a 
trade war at worst. 
If protection arises, it will probably not be because of any compelling 
economic case but rather because of political pressure. Most of us would not 
even think of trying to influence Congress to allow in as many cars as we 
wish to import so that we can all pay lower prices in the showroom, and so 
we collectively exert little pressure in favor of unrestricted imports. The 
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constituency favoring lower prices is very diffuse and hence weak, because 
the gains from lower prices are small for nearly everyone. On the other 
hand, a young auto worker with little seniority gains a great deal if the auto 
industry is protected and his job is preserved. He has a strong union to speak 
for his interests. The protectionist forces, though smaller in numbers, may 
well carry the day politically in certain sectors. 
There is, however, a circumstance in which protection merits serious 
consideration: the protection of infant industries. An infant industry is one 
which, although not economically viable in the short run, is expected to 
become economically viable in the not-too-distant future, especially when 
learning-by-doing is involved. Protection may be warranted to keep foreign 
firms from engaging in predatory pricing or in other ways preventing the 
infant from growing to maturity. A very common problem, though, is that 
the infants never grow up, but instead continue to demand protection forever 
and ever. Our national trade policy must distinguish between protection of 
infant industries (which may be warranted in certain cases) and protection 
of sunset industries (for which the pro-protection argument is considerably 
more dubious). 
In those instances (the majority, I think) where protection is not 
appropriate, a better type of intervention is economic restructuring. There is 
a role for the Department of Labor in facilitating this restructuring by 
fostering an active labor market policy. Some possible policy interventions 
include trade adjustment assistance to certain displaced workers, mobility 
assistance to those who possess the qualifications to take up highly-
productive jobs elsewhere in the economy, and training and retraining 
programs for those who lack the necessary qualifications. All such programs 
should, of course, be scrutinized using the best possible social cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Finally, there is at least one way in which we must protect ourselves 
against ourselves. This is by protecting against the tendency in some 
industries to seek short-run profits by selling out long-term interests. U.S. 
corporations and investors are being criticized for being excessively 
preoccupied with current-quarter profits. For an American firm to sell VCR 
technology for $25,000 to an overseas competitor (as is reputed to have 
occurred), and thereby lose the entire VCR market (as did occur), can 
hardly be in the long-run interest of the firm, let alone in the interest of 
American workers. Whether it is in the social interest to intervene to protect 
against this seeming market failure will have to be debated. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that market forces can have powerful, 
positive effects on workers' standards of living. This, I contend, is more apt 
to come about when priority is given to improving labor market outcomes 
rather than facilitating certain labor relations processes; when labor standards 
are promoted directly rather than indirectly; and when a market wage policy 
is adopted in preference either to a high wage policy or to wage repression. 
There can be little dispute that rapid economic growth is critical to the 
welfare of workers in the Third World. But prematurely high labor 
standards, including certain procedural labor rights, may conflict with job 
and income creation goals, which I regard as most important. This contrasts 
with the view of others who contend that without at least appropriate labor 
standards, firms may become locked into "sweating strategies" that produce 
poor economic outcomes as well as depriving workers of basic protections 
(Piore, this volume). To those who argue thus, I would submit that in many 
countries the alternative to using cheap labor in production is not to produce 
at all. Can this really be better for the workers involved? 
My concern that direct raising of labor standards may conflict with 
economic objectives arises from a fairly orthodox view of labor markets in 
the economy, one in which downward-sloping labor demand curves are 
taken as axiomatic, and empirically-warranted at that. On this view, labor 
standards raised directly by the government or indirectly through protection 
of associational and collective bargaining rights are likely to protect one 
segment of the work force at the expense of the remainder. Thus, I have 
argued that collective bargaining or minimum wages may lead to labor 
market segmentation, lower formal sector employment, and lower wages in 
uncovered sectors; ambitious labor codes have caused such adverse 
outcomes in some countries; and economic growth under market wage 
determination has brought about full employment, rapidly rising real wages, 
and consequent higher standards of living in a number of countries in the 
Far East that have tried it 
With respect to trade-linked international labor standards, implementa-
tion would also be difficult. In the words of Windmuller (1978): 
There are at least three problems with the idea of international 
labor standards which seem to me to defy solution under conditions 
of multinational negotiations. What are the criteria to determine fair 
standards? Who is entitled to participate in defining them? And by 
what means are they to be enforced? 
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Although these problems are not necessarily insurmountable, they must be 
faced head-on. 
Concern with the adverse labor market effects of premature protective 
labor legislation is not, however, a call for laissez-faire. Governments may 
play an active role in encouraging economic expansion of a type that will 
benefit workers, and indeed should be actively engaged in doing so. 
The organizers of this symposium set forth three fundamental questions 
for discussion. Here are my thoughts on each. The first is the question of 
how to provide countries at all stages of development with opportunities for 
growth that do not depend on abuses of labor standards. I have argued that 
labor standards are abused when the best job available to a worker is one 
paying a pittance and the worst is no job at all. Only by striving to innovate 
and produce more with existing resources is growth possible for all. 
Otherwise, we are caught in a zero-sum game. The goal of United States 
policy must be to increase efficiency at home, not to reduce efficiency 
abroad. Related to this is the choice of policy instrument. From the point of 
view of American labor, would it be better to promote labor standards 
abroad or to demand reciprocity in trade by tying foreigners' access to U.S. 
markets with the opening of overseas markets to U.S. goods? 
The second question is how to prevent labor conditions in advanced 
countries from being undermined by those in less developed trading partners. 
I have suggested that we in the advanced countries need to ask ourselves the 
same question the most successful newly-industrializing countries have been 
asking themselves over and over: what is it that we can produce efficiently 
that others who have the purchasing power would want to buy? Probably, 
the United States can continue to export farm products, computer software, 
educational services, and jet aircraft. It is equally probable that we will not 
be able to continue to export labor-intensive industrial products. The best 
way to prevent labor conditions in advanced countries from being under-
mined by competition from developing countries is to anticipate where 
developing countries will be making their next breakthroughs and moving 
out of those industries and into others where comparative advantage remains. 
However, the frictions entailed by such restructuring are considerable. An 
active labor market policy can help relax some of the more severe rigidities. 
Finally is the question of how to promote innovative, efficient firms and 
countries that properly observe labor standards. The single most important 
thing to do is to assure that product markets are kept open in the U.S. and 
around the world, so that those who can produce efficiently while observing 
labor standards can sell efficiently. The threat of protectionist actions by the 
U.S. and of retaliation abroad are both very real and very worrisome. 
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